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TiE words used in stating the question suggested bythe title are unfortunate. They are adopted to avoid using
words which are of the very essence of the questions involved-master and servant; apparently because of there
being something -derogatory to dignity to recognize the relation of master or the position as servant. Yet the whole
of the doctrine of liability of the one for the acts of the Other,
-aswell as all the doctrine as to control, and of the effect
of possession or occupation, depends on the relation of
master and servant, and has no place whatever in that of
employed and employer.
I The substance of this paper was delivered in the form of an.address
before the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania, in February,
x893. In its present form the paper is published at the request of the
Feitors, who consider the topic as peculiarly timely.
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A reference to this, as matter of taste, would be out of
place. But is it not well to mark the subtle effect on reasoning of the misuse of a word?
Is it surprising that those who are unaware of the real
essential distinction between master and employer, servant
and employed, or the more common employee, should fail
to observe the distinctions in rights and duties growing out
of the relations?
All lawyers are very keenly alive to the distinctioA between the independenf contractor and the mere
servant. While there is nothing servile imported by the
word servant, it does mean that there is a right in one
man to direct the conduct of* another, and consequently
there is a liability for that conduct; the c~nduct or acts of
-.'the-one are the conduct and acts of the other. Whenever
the .righ.t of direction exists, there is the relation of master
-and seryant, and whenever this relation exists, the consequences stated must follow.
This is not a rule of universal jurisprudence; it certinly
was not a rule in that nation which has given to the world
jurisprudence as a science, from whom all Europe has,
cerived its system of law as administered by,lawyers---not
the statutory or merely -arbitrary rules, but all that the e is:
of law. created by reasoning.. But for us it is the same
thing as if this rule was one of the necessary conclusions
of the human mind. There is not, as far as I can ascer*tam, a trace of any other rule in the common law at any
period. I think I have seen evidence of the consciousness
that there is somethig defective in the reasoning on which
this. stands, in two of the greatest of our lawyrers, Lord
I
WIMNSLEYDAI and Lord"HOLT.
There is a well-settled rule, applied in a large and importatf class of cases, which it may be proper to mention toe
illustrate the vital importance of this distinction between
servant and employed. The master of a ship is the servant
of the owner, and the latter is liable for the negligence of
the former, while himself totally unable to form a judgment on the subject, or to give a direction, or even to&
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tender rational advice. The passenger may be the employer of the master, but there is not the faintest resemblance to the relations of master and servant between them,
or only so far as to make the employed the master of the
employer. But then master assumes a new meaning.
Evidently, the question for discussion is the relations
of those species of the employed that, in the legal aspect,
are servants of the employer.
Apparently, this relation is simple, and free from all
those things that are stigmatized as. technicalities; and
this is true, but it is not everyone that has noticed 'the
existence of some very technical rules, nor that it is the
purest of-technicalities that alone excluded domestic slavery
before there was any legislation made necessary by the
existence of that institution among us, I mentiozi* this
because it is the cause of the most difficult question for,
solution in the whole subject, and this is effected solely by
the law for the enforcement of contracts.
The relation of master and servant (laying apprenticeship and the contracts on behalf of ififants out'of the case)
arises by contract, and cannot possibly arise otherwise.
Even when the contract is implied, or not expressed, it is

difficult to suggest a case where the fact of the 'contract',
and its terms, are not really as distinctly understood, as'
when everything on each side is clearly expressed. As a
general rule, theonly sanction for such contracts is an
action for the breach. Damages may be recovered, for
non-performance; performance cannot be compelled. Indeed, the common law furnishes no other. redress, either
on contracts or for property, since the real actions were
abolished, saving that of ejectment. It is the equity courts
that devised the remedy of specific performance, and these
have never allowed the grounds for this remedyi-the
worthlessness of the legal remedy-Lto sustain a claim to
this kind of redress where personal service of an continuance would be necessary. It is a thing the Courts have
never dreamed of enforcing,.' The fact that a man must
I Jessel, M. R., 14 Ch., Div. 487, Rigby v. Connol.
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personally do some act is of no momenL 'It is not
any ridiculous regard for human dignity that excludes
the jurisdiction; the execution of a deed is as personal an
act as the forging of a horseshoe. The latter is incapable
of being compelled, the former is compelled every day.
The single instance where the remedy, as a matter of
propriety, might be applied, is the case of an opera singer;
and it will be recollected how this was dealt with.
What is the reason for this rule? Precisely the same
that makes it impossible to pass the title to future earnings;
it belongs to the rekion of politics. If equity permitted
this to come within its modification of the common-law
rule as to the assignability of choses in acion, human
slavery would at once be established. Still more obvious
is it, that if contracts for labor could be specificglly enforced,
humai .slavery would be sanctioned, even though it wasconfined to cases of consent.'
I do not think one can fail to see the important bearing on the problem, that I hope to discuss, that this fact
has. Since the abolishment of imprisonment for. debt, the
legal remedy for non-perfoimance of a contract to serve, is
io utterly futile that probably no one ever heard of such an
action. Suits on contracts to employ are. quite common.
What an element it is in the discussion of rights created
by contracts that there is a remedy for one party only!
The relation we are considering is one created by con-'
tract incapable of compulsory performance, and with no
,real remedy for the failure of performance by the servant
furnished by the laW, while none is more dreaded by-the
master than the one that the common law impaitially
affords to both. His cage *must be clear, or he .pays full
wages, even -for no services rendered. .Itis not very important, therefore, whether time contracts are actually
made or not, for there are probably no time tontractsnone in which the servant may not leave the employment,
or in which the master cannot discharge on ceasing to be
2See
Lord ANsr-=i.D's remark during the argument of Chippendale v. Tomlinson, 4 Doug., 321.
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able to furnish work. This sort of contract, whether by
the day or for a term, ought to give rise to no vexed questions, and as an abstraction it does not. It is a contract
at will, from moment to moment, not even involving the
term of one working day. How can there arise any questions of law about it? Yet there have arisen questions sd
grave that in their solution there have been homicide and
mutilation, and numberless acts of minor violence; whether
these were criminal or praiseworthy, I have not the means
of forming an opinion, and will not discuss hypothetical
cases, even though they bear the marks of authority and
certainty bf a printed and published statement.
There has been one authoritative and authentic statement of the grounds on which these acts of violence are
justified in resistance of the right of the master to employ
others. I may allude to it hereafter. At present I desire
to deal with the questions, as far as possible, free from any
paiticular instance. It is desirable, if possible, to gefier-.
alize before considering particular cases.
What difference is there between the purchaer--of
labor, whether skilled or not, and any other person seeking,
to bargain for something he is to get?
We are dealing witli the legal aspect, not with the sentimental nor with the moral questions; As far as I am aware,.
there is no distinction between the employers of labor and.
any other species of employment other .than the duty of
obedience to the command of the employer. This. is inL
volved in the relation with which we are dealing. Btit
this is not a subject any one has ever disputed. No one
has ever supposed that the class of persons we are speaking
of has the right to insist on doing their-work in their own
way, regardless of the command of the employer. The
rate of wages has been the constant subject of differences.
Hours of labor many years since were also the grounds bf
serious disputes, and there is a general movement looking
to the regulation of this by statute. This belongs to political economy, not law. But, so far as the law is concerned,
all rights and duties are regulated by contracts, including,
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of course, custom in. defining the meaning of the words.
used. The contract when made is on the footing of all
other contracts of purchase, the sanction of which is only.
damages, for the breach. Anything like duty to continue
the contract, or to give the preference to those who have
been employed over strangers, has never existed; it coifld
not well be without a c6rrelative duty to serve, and no one
has suggested the existence of such a duty. That would
be temporary slavery.
There is, however, in most States,
a legislative license affecting a particular class of the employed which deserves special attention. I need scarcely
say I disclaim all right and all intefition to discuss the prudence or the wisdom of such statutes. It is impossible to
doubt that there are very strong reasons for sanctioning
combinations of the employed to regulate the terms of their
employment. Without it there can be no real fairness in
respect of capacity to discuss the terms of the bargain. We
will take Pennsylvania as an example.
The Act of Assemblyin that commonwealth provides:
(I) That a refusal to work by a laborer, workingman or
journeyman, for any one, when in his opinion the wages are
insufficient, or the treatment of the laborer, etc.; is brutal
or offensive, shall not be punishable. There is no meaning
in this. 'The act never was punishable. (2) But coupled
with this is the same provision in the plural, and the right
is extended to the laborer, etc., as the meniber of any club,
pociety or association; and then the refusal to work is justi- fiable, if the continued labor would'be contrary to the rules,
regulations or by-laws of any club, etc.,.to which the laborer,
etc., belongs. Then comes two provisos: one, that the Act
shall not apply to a member of any club, etc., the constitution, by-laws, rules and regulations of which are in strict
conformity to the Constitution of this State and of -the
United States; the other, that retains the liability to prosecution for hindering any one who desires to labor for thdr
employer, and "their" refers to the combined persons who
hinder.
This certainly makesa vast change in the legal rela-
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tions of master and servant. But it is only the r~lation as
it affects the State. The rights and liabilities of the parties between themselves are not changed. In this respect
the law is precisely as it is in reference to the violent enforcing of the right of possession. The statute of forcibly entry
and detainer does not affect the rights of property unless
indirectly by the judgment of restitution, when possession
has been obtained contrary to the provisions of the statute.
It is imposible to dispute the importance of this enactment. The whole law of conspiracy, and the whole law
in relation to riots and unlawful assemblies, is inVolved.
Their chief support rests on the notorious dangers resulting from large gatherings of men with no supervision by
government, and the almost boundless consequences of
-combination. Whether the inevitable consequences were
foreseen, and are sufficiently guarded against, is, perhaps,
useless to discuss. Steps like this are certainly advances,.
and cannot be easily retracted.'
It is difficult to suppose that the' first branch of the
legislation could have been supposed to be necessary.
Unless the breach of a contract was intended to be sanctioned, there never was a doubt as to the existence of the
right to decline to work because the wages were insufficieint or because of ill treatment. But one cannot but be
Surprised that the clause that imposed the obligation to
withdraw fr6bi work at the dictate. of a -secret society
should have been permitted. - True, it adds nothing to the
license already conferred, but it appears to sanction, and
-does sanction, as far as it can, the surrender of one's liberty to the dictate of a club or society. Whether it is wise
to do this, or whether it would have been wise to attempt
to battle with this eiril of a voluntary surrender of one's
right to labor, may well be questioned. But the suffering
that has and must ensue until the evils are eliminated is
enormous. It is curious to note the changes of a century
in this respect. The power to license workmen-the control of the capacity to use one's skill in a trade during the
last century-was a tyranny of the most oppressive-kind,
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but it was in the masters. It is now transferred to the
men. But it is the power to contract that is thus affected,
not the contract when made.
Therefore, it is plain that there is no law affecting the
rights of master and servant, as such, other than -the law
of the contract; its sanction being abundant to compel
adherence by the master, and utterly worthless as affectingthe servant, unless he is possessed of property which he
cannot persuade a jury is worth less than three hundred
dollars.
I do not think any reasonable man will assert that it
was- the intention of the legislature to tack on to every
contract a condition-that it is to cease to be binding whenever a club or society votes that it shall not be performed.
I think it means that the people who, by a vote, prevent
men from contracting to work cannot be indicted, and that
this is all that it does mean.
, There agre two points in the relation of master and servant that may be supposed to be the natural outcome of
this legislation. Singularly enough, the more unreasonable
and extravagant of the two is expressly sanctioned by.the
legislation, unless the capacity, of the club to legislate has
been restricted by the Act itself.
Everyone who has watched the papers must have
noticed the frequency of the issue of a command to withdraw from work, because material to be used has been
made or worked upon by persons not belonging to a particular, club or society. Those who are not concerned in
the actual operations of builders find it difficult to con6eive
how any one can be bold enough to contract when the performance depends an the capacity of anybody to deprive
him of the power of performance in this way. Obviously,
there is some way of escaping, or all building, indeed,
all -work, would stop. A reference to the statute shows.
that this is sanctioned unless there is something in the
Constitution that prevents. I am aware of nothing that
can be tortured into this unless it be the platitude of the
inalienable rights, which unfortunately works for the by-
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law as well as against it. There is no reference to the laws,
of the State in the proviso. There is no requirement that
the by-law shall conform to the existing laws of the State
regulating conspiracy; quite the reverse. There is not
even the vague clause requiring that the regulations shall
be reasonable. The laborer may not only contract to
abstain from work to remedy any grievance, but to bringabout consequences as remote as the quarrying of stone in
a foreigu State, to compel submission by the masters there
to their workmen; and we must admit that this, which,
appears to shock every sense of justice, is expressly sanctioned as the right of all laborers, -workingmen And journeymen; but the injustice is in the servant, not in the law.
All that the law has done is to relieve the servant from the
penalty attached to a combination. But for the combifiation there never was any legal objection to these acts.
But as we would all feel that a master who agreed t6 dismiss a servant for no other cause than to gratify the malice
of a friend was utterly contemptible, so one cannot fail to
observe the degradation of the moral character which can'
consent to abandon the master in his hour of need at the
dictate of another, and for no cause whatever affecting himself. I myself cannot doubt that no such consequences as.
these were foreseen.- If we look at the statute we find the
grounds on which the men may combine to refuse to work,
are perfectly reasonable-insufficiency of wages and brutal
treatment. Could any reasonable man have supposed that'
such a power as now exists and is exercised was covered
by the license to plead the rule of the club? This is certainly a part of the law regulating the relation of master
and servant, though it is not possible to state it without
seeming to trench upon the province of the legislature in
forecasting the consequences of its conduct.
There are, however, two things that cannot be omitted
from the present discussion. One is a remedy that appears
to commend itself to a great number of persons--arbilration; the other is the rights of the.workmen resulting from
actual occupation of the premises on which the employment is exercised.
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As to the fi st. Eve.ything depends on correct definitions in these matters. If by arbitration is, meant the

right to advise, and the duty to listen and comprehend the
-advice, I will say but little. ' If any one supposes that
benefits can result'from calling in third persons to advise, by
all means let it be tried; Only we must not deceive ourselves by calling this arbitration. It has not one feature of
.irbitration. That means, not advice, but command. It
'relates to existing rights and dities. Itis a determination
,bya tribunal other than the ordinary courts of the country,
*1s-towhat are the -ights of disputants, and what must be
.done. by one or both. These are -fixed. Arbitration to
deteimine ,what shall be right is not arbitration.- The
.alifficulty here is,.there are no rights and no duties. No'one
o can possibly say he has a right to the labor of another
unless there is a contract that binds, and probably no instance can be produced of any difference existing on that
subject. On the other hand, there cannot be conceived a
right to be imployed unless there is a contract, and the
meaning of such a contract has probably never led' to a
strike. The grounds for striking have been hours, wages,
_"the persons -to be employed, for whom the work may be
done, and what materials may be used. BURNS'- pathetic
lines' are caricatured. The beggar for employment is -a.
fellow-servant or laborer; and the fellow-laborer is one
-who reuses him permission to toil. The master is now
,the beggar for permission to employ. Arbitration ex vi
Mei'mii
xmeans a sentence which is as binding and enforceable as a judgment of a court. Obviously, thee is no'power
-anywhere adequate to this. I do not dispute, as an abstraction, the power of the legislature, though I think it extremely doubtful whether compulsion to perform a contract
of the kind we are discussing is within the powers of the
1kgislature. - It actually involveg the power to subject one
to domestic slavery. But assuming all that can be asked,
that the power is limited to what all will agree are usual
and proper contracts, of what practical value is compulsory
labor with a thousand intelligent minds bent on evasion?
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The master's duties are definite, and can be readily enforced;
-theservant's, never. What are the guaranties of all labor
-other than a conscientious sense of duty? Will any one
-exist in the case of compulsory labor? What reliance is
there on the sense of duty in one who feels he is under
unjust compulsion? Who would entrust the safety of a
mill to operatives thus coerced to work?
To my mind, the notion of settling such matters by
arbitration, or anything of that nature, however modified,
is utterly absurd, for the evil has no relation to the remedy.
The power to control one's business, and the power to determine what obligations will be assumed, cannot be the subject of arbitration; that would make the arbitrator the
manager of the business on the one side and the owne of
the men on the other. Anything short of this is not arbi.1ration, though it may be the wisest of schemes, and
though it may solve all difficulties.
The right of he employed to property entrusted to
-them in the performance of their work, their right to the
houses they are furnished with, and to the mills or buildings they oceupy when at work, is a most important branch
-of this subject. There has been some confusion and one
mistake in this matter. It has even been supposed to
-depend on the sacredness of the home; we have even seen
-the old maxim quoted, "Ia man's house is his castle." It
would be better to rest it on the rule in Taltarum's case, for
-that could not mislead, and this misleads even those who
-ought to know better.
. The basis of the rule governing the relation is this-the possession of the servant is the possession of the master.
It extends to the possession of all kinds of property. There
-is no distinction between the character of the possession'of
a body-servant of his master's clothes and watch and the.
possession of a house or mill by one employed by the
-owner, if the possession is in the character of servant,
-even if it be that of one employed to hold the possession.
This doctrine is based on another, that, so far as I know, is
.a universal proposition. It extends beyond the relation of
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-naster and servant. One wh,6 receives- anything for a par,ticular purpose holds for that purpose. only, .and as the* agent. of the depositor, .and can set up- no'antagonistic-.
'claim.'
We see this in cases of remittances, eoupled with
a direction to apply the proceeds-the direction must beobeyed, or the remittance returned ; it cannot be retained
on any other pretence. A tenant cannot set up even his.
own title as against his lessor. So the person .entrusted.as
a servant, whether it be with one's food,,clothing, house'.hold goods, the key of the safe, or with a habitation, is not.
a possessor or. in possession--he holds for and as the master.
" '
The rile is stated by the great authority, Lord CoxE,
* in a case occurring in the Star Chamber, reported in Moore
The- chiefg of the three courts united in the judgment.
Could the owner of a house be indicted for forcible entry,.
drfor a riot,. for violently entering the house and ousting"".the person who held it as care-taker for the owner? The.
parties were considerable persons. A countes, whowas theowner, and' Dame Russell, who was the carefaker, and the.
fIouse was a castle., The ruling was; there was no-forgible:
entry; because the person who entered, entered on himself,
. and there was no riot, because the violence was upon theperson at whose, request -it was employed. 'Possibly, weiiiight state the reasons differently to-day. Every genera'tion has its own mode of reasoning, at least among lawyers.
• We mifight explain it as Chief Justice GIBSON did, that-thestatute was not intended to protect the wrong-doer., but ta
prevent violence, and that it was not improper to use theforce necessary to repossess one's self of propeity coifessedly
entrusted to another as one's servant or caretaker, and theriot, if there was one, was that bf the man who undertook
to resist, by violence, the performance of his duty to sirrender possession. This is but a modem paraphrase of'
JLord CoxE's reasoning, which, to the ignorant, may seem
absurd. In fact, there is no sort of difference .between a.
servant and any intruder, saving that the servant, having
Delany v. Fox, 2 C. B. N. S., 768; Williams v. Williams, 3 Merri-vale, 159.
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"been invited to enter, must be given an opportunity to
retire, without suffering violence, unless he refuses to
comply with the request to leave. In Massachusetts, I
notice that within, a year the knocking down a man who
has entered after being asked to leave, is not recognized ;As
a breach even of the public peace.
It must be obvious that if actual occupancy, of itself,
gives the right to insist on the use of that form of redress,
which is assured to persons claiming title, it would be
impossible to furnish accommodations to any servant; for
-who could possibly assign a chamber to a domestic if ejectment was the only remedy to obtain possession of the room
-when the relation of servant ceased? Nor is there any
-possibleground for making a distinction between separate .
" dwellings, furnished as part of the wages, and the rooh"
within the mastei's dwelling. It would be strange, indeed,,
if the law were otherwise. Whatever else we may say.of'
-the common law, it is a practical system. Aid-can any'thing be more utterly incapable of being applied to human "
affairs than a rule that a-servant, if furnished with a house
-orroom. by the master, cannot be removed from it otherwise-than by a process intended to determine the legal.,right of
possession .to land?
It will, therefore, be found that there is not any varia-tion.or hesitation in applying the principle that the possesSion of the servant is the- possession of the master, and this,
-whether it is necessary to secure the right of the master 6r,
-not. It is applied to cases in which the relations of master
and servant are absolutely excluded from consideration. I
-will give you some examples, for there are some elementary
propositions for which it is difficult to find express authority.
I think it will be admitted that one who, as tenant, had the
right of possession, has, after his tenancy expires, as much
of right to possession as any one can possibly have whose,
-only right is that he was.originally invited to enter, or placed
in possession by the owner. What is the right of such a
-parson is exactly defined by GIBSON, C. J.1 It is that the
' Overseer v. Lewis,

E W.
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-owner can forcibly dispossess him on tthe instant, by day or
by night, and for motives of mere caprice; the only qualification is that.he may not use any greaterforce than may
be necessary, and doi no wanton damage. Is it necessary to.
say this is the legal right? Probably no man ever acted in
such a spirit, but it is essential that the law shall clearly
define legal rights, and not qualify them by any reference.tolaws of courtesy, propriety, or even humanity, and for this
,plain reason that any qualification is one of law, and, therefore, universal, and introduces elements of uncertainty in
the application that render these plain rules for plain people
utterly incapable of being nsed. A 'servaftt occupies the
position of all persons who are on the premises at the
-requestof the owner. The request being Withdrawn, all ae
mere intruders, except possibly for the space of time that is
required for them to remove theirpersons.
The. books are full of this, but generally by implication,
for I am aware of but one who ever'disphted it. Indirectly
it has been disputed in a multitude of cases; But the question
has always been, What -are the relations ? Are they that of
master and servat? 'That being" ascertained, the consequences follow. Hughes V. Derry,' before PARKE, B., the
defendant had been put in possession of a house on the fari
..of which he was the manager, under a written agreemefit
allwing him andhisfamily to have the use of the dwelin'gfree'ofrent. .Was this a lease? No. "Was he entitled to
notice to quit? No; because the service (employment, we
would call it) had ended, and the occupation was a mode of
remunerating the bailiff. The other cases. are collected in.
Smith's -"Master and Servant."
He says, page 8o::
"Where a servant occupies premises belonging to his.
* master, and has, dn that account, less wages, his occupation.
is that of the master."
He illustrates this by a coachman having rooms over astable, a gamekeeper with a lodge in the park, a gardener
living in an out-house, a porter at a lodge, at the park gate,
and he adds, and such servants, when -dismissed from the
"9 C. & P., 494.
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service, have no right to continue in the occupancy of these
houses as tenants, nor are they entitled to notice to quit.
Some cases that he cites deserve attention.' A person was
put into possession of a building to carry on trade, and
there was a stipulation for a notice to quit. But as the
occupation was for the master, and as his servant, it was
held that he could be ejected summarily and without notice.
Such a person is not de jure even entitled to a reasonable
time to remove his furniture. 2 The judgment is that of
Lord TENTERDEN, the gentlest of men. The rule does not
apply if the servant hires the house, though the master
pays the rent. An occupation as a servant does not give
a settlement, nor make the servant liable to be rated, nor
qualify him for office, as being a substantial housekeeper,
and what is meant by servant is shown by the decisions.
A Wesleyan minister is such in respect of the house fur-.
nished him by his employers. The manager of book
society, officers of government if compelled to reside,
pre.chers at Canterbury Cathedral, and the hall-keeper for
a borough-these are servants. The occupation is that of
the master, not of the actual occupant, in an action for disturbance of a way,3 and in an indictment for burglary, there
stated by ELLENBOROUGH, C. J., and decided in 2 Taunton, 339, where

MANSFIELD,

C. J., asks, as the test, Could

he (the.owner) not have turned him (the servant) out when
he would?
I may here quote, in justification for what may seem so.
plain, the remark of ERLE, C. J. , in White v. Bailey, that
this distinction is of extreme importance, for it is what
makes the difference between an estate and no estate) which
is where one is put in possession by another to -perform a
duty he is employed to do.'
The result of all this is, that there are no other relaI Mahew v. Suttle, 4 9. & Bl., 347.
2 Nicholl v. McKaig, lo B. & Cr., 72r.
3 Berlic v. Beaumont, i6 East., 33.
43r L.J , C. P., 253.
'The cases is cited in Smith's "iMaster and Servant," 83.
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tions between the employed and the employer recognized,
-by law except those that arise by contract, andthere is no
mode 6f enforcing that contract that differs from the reme-dies for all contracts of hire or purchase.
There is no possession or occupancy of land of the employer saving at the will of and for the employed, and this
-tightand duty terminates at the employer's mere will, and .
that instantly, and his motive cannot be inquired into-a
title common to all matters of property.
I.have ventured to criticize the remedy of arbitration,
-which, to my mind, is absolutely misleading, because it
appears to contain a remedy which it certainly does not.
What it is supposed to contain is something that, if correctly defined, no one has ever, or probably ever will,
propose.
If the foregoing contention is true, even substantially,
-it is'obvious that the burning question of the day has no
possible beginming of a solution in anything furnished by the
law, any more or further than those affecting the relation ofbiuyer and seller, which" are not varied because aifamine
-has occurred. I have listened to all and read much. Singularly enough, the most affecting of all arguments and
appeals on the side of labor thatJ have seen comes from
.'.the pen of a British peer.'
But he offers no solution,
-unless he intends to shadow forth a form of protection by
th , legislative exclusion of the- right to employ and to be
-employe
d in favor of a class to the exclusion of another
'class.
7

The arguments, or justifications,, or maii-ifestoes,,what-ever they may be,. from the men or their leaders at Homestead, where the language is not mere vituperation, has
*onsisted in the suppression. of the one and only-difficulty
that even tends to affect the employers' side.* I do not
propose to- consider these, which are questions of political
1

Earl of Dunraven in the Nineteenth Century, for June. At the
-meeting of the State Federation of Labor at Chester, August 19, Mr.
McVay proposed the same remedy. It was opposed by Mr. Boyle, but
whether, there was anything. more than a discussion the newspaper
-eport does not say.

